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American Economic Review Vol. 99 No. 4 2009

Hindsight, Foresight, and Insight: An Experimental Study of a Small-Market Investment Game with Common and Private Values

Asen Ivanov1; Dan Levin2; James Peck2

1 Department of Economics, Virginia Commonwealth University, 301 W. Main Street, Snead Hall B3149, Richmond, VA 23284. · 2 Department of Economics, The Ohio State University, 1945 N High Street, Arps Hall 410, Columbus, OH 43210.

Abstract

We experimentally test an endogenous-timing investment model in which subjects privately observe their cost of investing and a signal correlated with the common investment return. Subjects overinvest, relative to Nash. We separately consider whether subjects draw inferences, in hindsight, and use foresight to delay profitable investment and learn from market activity. In contrast to Nash, cursed equilibrium, and level-k predictions, behavior hardly changes across our experimental treatments. Maximum likelihood estimates are inconsistent with belief-based theories. We offer an explanation in terms of boundedly rational rules of thumb, based on insights about the game, which provides a better fit than quantal response equilibrium.

DOI
10.1257/aer.99.4.1484
Volume
99
Issue
4
Pages
1484-1507
Language
en
Sources
openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

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