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American Economic Review Vol. 105 No. 10 2015

Disability Insurance and the Dynamics of the Incentive Insurance Trade-Off

Hamish Low1; Luigi Pistaferri2

1 Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge, CB3 9DD, UK (e-mail: ) · 2 Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 (e-mail: )

Abstract

We provide a life-cycle framework for comparing insurance and disincentive effects of disability benefits. The risks that individuals face and the parameters of the Disability Insurance (DI ) program are estimated from consumption, health, disability insurance, and wage data. We characterize the effects of disability insurance and study how policy reforms impact behavior and welfare. DI features high rejection rates of disabled applicants and some acceptance of healthy applicants. Despite worse incentives, welfare increases as programs become less strict or generosity increases. Disability insurance interacts with welfare programs: making unconditional means-tested programs more generous improves disability insurance targeting and increases welfare.

DOI
10.1257/aer.20110108
Volume
105
Issue
10
Pages
2986-3029
Language
en
Sources
crossref openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib

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