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American Economic Review Vol. 99 No. 1 2009

Taxes and Employment Subsidies in Optimal Redistribution Programs

Paul Beaudry1; Charles Blackorby2; Dezsö Szalay3

1 Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z1, and NBER. · 2 Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK CV4 7AL, and GREQAM. · 3 Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry (UK), CV4 7AL.

open access

Abstract

This paper explores how to optimally set taxes and transfers when taxation authorities are uninformed about individuals' value of time in both market and nonmarket activities; and can observe both market-income and time allocated to market employment. We show that optimal redistribution in this environment involves a cutoff wage whereby workers above the cutoff are taxed as they increase their income, while workers earning a wage below the cutoff receive an income supplement as they increase their income. Finally, we show that the optimal program transfers zero income to individuals who choose not to work.

DOI
10.1257/aer.99.1.216
Volume
99
Issue
1
Pages
216-242
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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