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American Economic Review Vol. 89 No. 5 1999

Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation

Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg1; Giovanni Maggi2

1 Department of Economics, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027. · 2 Department of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544.

Abstract

The Grossman-Helpman "Protection for Sale" model, concerning the political economy of trade protection, yields clear predictions for the cross-sectional structure of import barriers. Our objective is to check whether the predictions of the Grossman-Helpman model are consistent with the data and, if the model finds support, to estimate its key structural parameters. We find that the pattern of protection in the United States in 1983 is broadly consistent with the predictions of the model. A surprising finding is that the weight of welfare in the government's objective function is many times larger than the weight of contributions.

DOI
10.1257/aer.89.5.1135
Volume
89
Issue
5
Pages
1135-1155
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref openalex

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