American Economic Review Vol. 110 No. 10 2020

Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment

David K. Levine¹; Andrea Mattozzi²

¹ Department of Economics, EUI, and WUSTL (email: ) · ² Department of Economics, EUI, and MOVE (email: )

Abstract

We introduce a model where social norms of voting participation are strategically chosen by competing political parties and determine voters’ turnout. Social norms must be enforced through costly peer monitoring and punishment. When the cost of enforcement of social norms is low, the larger party is always advantaged. Otherwise, in the spirit of Olson (1965), the smaller party may be advantaged. Our model shares features of the ethical voter model and it delivers novel and empirically relevant comparative statics results.

DOI

10.1257/aer.20170476

Volume

110

Issue

10

Pages

3298-3314

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite

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