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Contemporary Accounting Research Vol. 35 No. 2 2018

Blockholder Exit Threats and Financial Reporting Quality

Yiwei Dou1; Ole‐Kristian Hope2; Wayne B. Thomas3; Youli Zou4

1 New York University · 2 University of Toronto and BI Norwegian Business School · 3 University of Oklahoma · 4 The George Washington University

Abstract

Recent theoretical and empirical studies suggest that blockholders (shareholders with ownership ≥ 5 percent) exert governance through the threat of exit. Blockholders have strong incentives to gather private information and sell their shares when managers are perceived to underperform. To prevent blockholders from selling their shares and the firm from suffering a stock price decline, managers align their actions with the interests of shareholders. As a result of the greater manager‐shareholder alignment, managers' actions are more likely to be in shareholders' best interest, and consequently there is less need for managers to manipulate earnings. Consistent with these predictions from economic theory, we find evidence that as exit threat increases, firms have higher financial reporting quality. Theory also predicts that the impact of blockholders' exit threat on financial reporting quality (FRQ) should increase as the manager's wealth is tied more closely to the stock price, and this is what we find. Our study contributes to the research on the impact of shareholders on FRQ and to an emerging literature on the impact of blockholders in financial markets. Blockholders play an important role in managers' reporting outcomes through their actions as informed investors.

DOI
10.1111/1911-3846.12404
Volume
35
Issue
2
Pages
1004-1028
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex

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