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Contemporary Accounting Research Vol. 41 No. 4 2024

The use of cash flows metrics in CEO compensation and the design of loan contracts

Guojin Gong1; Xin Daniel Jiang2; Biqin Xie3

1 School of Business University of Connecticut Stamford Connecticut USA · 2 School of Accounting and Finance University of Waterloo Waterloo Ontario Canada · 3 US Department of the Treasury Office of Financial Research Washington DC USA

open access

Abstract

This study examines whether using cash‐flow‐based performance metrics (CFM) in CEO compensation contracts affects the design of loan contracts. Cash‐flow‐based performance evaluation explicitly motivates the CEO to improve the firm's cash flows, which may enhance debt repayment ability and reduce credit risk. We thus hypothesize that lenders, anticipating this incentive effect, offer lower loan spreads and reduce cash‐flow‐based performance covenants when firms use CFM in CEO compensation contracts. Consistent with our expectation, the use of CFM is associated with lower loan spreads and less use of cash‐flow‐based performance covenants. These findings remain robust after we account for endogeneity. Furthermore, these results are more pronounced in firms with higher credit risk or risk of cash flow shortfalls, suggesting that lenders consider internally generated cash flows more valuable when borrowers face higher external financing costs or have greater liquidity concerns. Additionally, we find that using CFM is associated with improved cash flow performance and enhanced creditworthiness, which supports the notion that CFM is an effective incentive mechanism. Overall, our evidence suggests that lenders consider the incentive effect of cash‐flow‐based performance evaluation in the debt contracting process.

DOI
10.1111/1911-3846.12981
Volume
41
Issue
4
Pages
2384-2416
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex

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