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Contemporary Accounting Research Vol. 39 No. 4 2022

Examining the Effects of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act on Executive Compensation*

Lisa De Simone1; Charles McClure2; Bridget Stomberg3

1 University of Texas at Austin · 2 Chicago Booth School of Business · 3 Kelley School of Business at Indiana University

Abstract

As part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), the US Congress repealed a long‐standing exception that allowed companies to deduct executives' qualified performance‐based compensation in excess of $1 million. The purpose of this study is to examine whether Congress achieved its stated objective of reversing a shift in executive compensation away from cash compensation and toward performance pay, which Congress believed led executives to focus on short‐term results rather than the long‐term success of the company. Across a battery of tests, including a difference‐in‐differences design that exploits the staggered time‐series implementation of the deduction limit, we find evidence compatible with the new deduction limit having no effect on executives' salary, performance pay or total compensation, inconsistent with Congressional intent. Our results suggest that taxes are not a first‐order effect of executive pay and that tax regulation could be relatively ineffective at curbing executive compensation.

DOI
10.1111/1911-3846.12801
Volume
39
Issue
4
Pages
2376-2408
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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