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Contemporary Accounting Research Vol. 34 No. 2 2017

Executive Gender Pay Gaps: The Roles of Female Risk Aversion and Board Representation

Mary Ellen Carter1; Francesca Franco2; Mireia Giné3

1 Carroll School of Management, Boston College · 2 London Business School · 3 IESE Business School, Universidad de Navarra, WRDS, The Wharton School

open access

Abstract

Using a large sample of executives in S&P 1500 firms over 1996–2010, we document significant salary and total compensation gaps between female and male executives and explore two possible explanations for the gaps. We find support for greater female risk aversion as one contributing factor. Female executives hold significantly lower equity incentives and demand larger salary premiums for bearing a given level of compensation risk. These results suggest that females’ risk aversion contributes to the observed lower pay levels through its effect on ex ante compensation structures. We also find evidence that the lack of gender diversity on corporate boards affects the size of the gaps. In firms with a higher proportion of female directors on the board, the gaps in salary and total pay levels are lower. Together, these findings suggest that female higher risk aversion may act as a barrier to full pay convergence, despite the mitigating effect from greater gender diversity on the board.

DOI
10.1111/1911-3846.12286
Volume
34
Issue
2
Pages
1232-1264
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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