Journal of Corporate Finance Vol. 12 No. 3 2006
Can the agency costs of debt and equity explain the changes in executive compensation during the 1990s?
Abstract
Contracting theory predicts that greater equity-related compensation will decrease the agency problems of equity but may exacerbate the agency problems of debt. We present evidence that the agency costs of debt may have declined during the 1990s. Specifically, changes in the financial characteristics of our sample firms suggest that underinvestment, asset substitution, and financial distress became less likely. Furthermore, agency costs of equity increased during the 1990s, primarily because firms became more difficult to monitor. Together, the findings provide an explanation for why more firms used option-based compensation in the latter 1990s, and why the proportion of options in compensation structure increased throughout the decade of the 1990s.
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.09.001
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 516-535
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref