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Econometrica Vol. 74 No. 5 2006

The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making

B. Douglas Bernheim1; Antonio Rangel1; Luis Rayo2,3

1 Stanford University · 2 University of Illinois Chicago · 3 University of Chicago

Abstract

We examine legislative policy making in institutions with two empirically relevant features: agenda setting occurs in real time and the default policy evolves. We demonstrate that these institutions select Condorcet winners when they exist, provided a sufficient number of individuals have opportunities to make proposals. In policy spaces with either pork barrel or pure redistributional politics (where a Condorcet winner does not exist), the last proposer is effectively a dictator or near-dictator under relatively weak conditions. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.

DOI
10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00701.x
Volume
74
Issue
5
Pages
1161-1190
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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