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Econometrica Vol. 87 No. 4 2019

Equivalence of Stochastic and Deterministic Mechanisms

Yi-Chun Chen1; Wei He2; Jiangtao Li3; Yeneng Sun4

1 Department of Economics, Risk Management Institute, National University of Singapore · 2 Department of Economics, Chinese University of Hong Kong · 3 School of Economics, Singapore Management University · 4 Departments of Economics and of Mathematics, Risk Management Institute, National University of Singapore

open access

Abstract

We consider a general social choice environment that has multiple agents, a finite set of alternatives, independent types, and atomless type distribution. We show that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism, there exists an equivalent deterministic mechanism that (1) is Bayesian incentive compatible; (2) delivers the same interim expected allocation probabilities and the same interim expected utilities for all agents; and (3) delivers the same ex ante expected social surplus. This result holds in settings with a rich class of utility functions, multidimensional types, interdependent valuations, and in settings without monetary transfers. To prove our result, we develop a novel methodology of mutual purification, and establish its link with the mechanism design literature.

DOI
10.3982/ecta14698
Volume
87
Issue
4
Pages
1367-1390
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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