Econometrica Vol. 55 No. 1 1987
Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem
Abstract
When a decision rule is implemented using a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism in which the messages are publically obser vable, the players' information is augmented by their observation of each others' strategies. In this paper the authors study the set of Bayesian implementable decision rules which have the further property that the information c onveyed in the process of thier implementation does not invalidate the optimality of the players' strategies. Such rules are called posterior implementable. The authors concentrate on a two-person problem with two possible decisions and, for this problem, they obtain a complete characterization of the set of posterior implementable decision rules.
- DOI
- 10.2307/1911157
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 69
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex