Econometrica Vol. 55 No. 3 1987
Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
Abstract
Buyer's preferences over auctions depend on their measure of absolute risk aversion. If it is constant and they have independent private values, they are indifferent between a first-price auction (FPA), a second-price auction (SPA), and a first-price auction in which the number of bidders is revealed before bids are taken (FPA- R). If they have decreasing absolute risk aversion, they prefer the SPA to the FPA-R to the FPA. Their preference for the SPA is diminished to the extent that their values are affiliated. Affiliation also causes them to prefer the number of bidders to be revealed, whereas the seller then prefers to keep it secret.
- DOI
- 10.2307/1913603
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 633
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex