Econometrica Vol. 58 No. 5 1990
Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
Abstract
The authors extend E. Maskin's results on Nash implementation. First, they establish a condition that is both necessary and sufficient for Nash implementability if there are three or more agents (the case covered by Maskin's sufficiency result). Second--and more important--they examine the two-agent case (for which there existed no general sufficiency results). The two-agent model is the leading case for applications to contracting and bargaining. For this case, too, they establish a condition that is both necessary and sufficient. The authors use their theorems to derive simpler sufficiency conditions that are applicable in a wide variety of economic environments.
- DOI
- 10.2307/2938301
- Volume
- 58
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1083
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref