Econometrica Vol. 72 No. 1 2004
Notes and Comments the Amsterdam Auction
open access
Abstract
The Amsterdam auction has been used to sell real estate in the Dutch capital for centuries. By awarding a premium to the highest losing bidder, the Amsterdam auction favors weak bidders without having the implementation difficulties of Myerson's (1981) optimal auction. In a series of experiments, we compare the standard first-price and English auctions, the optimal auction, and two variants of the Amsterdam auction. With strongly asymmetric bidders, the second-price Amsterdam auction raises substantially more revenues than standard formats and only slightly less than the optimal auction. Copyright Econometric Society 2004.
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00484.x
- Volume
- 72
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 281-294
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref