Econometrica Vol. 88 No. 3 2020

Social Learning Equilibria

Elchanan Mossel¹; Manuel Mueller-Frank²; Allan Sly³; Omer Tamuz⁴

¹ Department of Mathematics, MIT · ² Department of Economics, IESE Business School · ³ Department of Mathematics, Princeton University · ⁴ Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Caltech

Abstract

We consider a large class of social learning models in which a group of agents face uncertainty regarding a state of the world, share the same utility function, observe private signals, and interact in a general dynamic setting. We introduce social learning equilibria, a static equilibrium concept that abstracts away from the details of the given extensive form, but nevertheless captures the corresponding asymptotic equilibrium behavior. We establish general conditions for agreement, herding, and information aggregation in equilibrium, highlighting a connection between agreement and information aggregation.

DOI

10.3982/ecta16465

Volume

88

Issue

3

Pages

1235-1267

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite

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