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Econometrica Vol. 51 No. 5 1983

The Theory of Syndicates and Linear Sharing Rules

Amin H. Amershi; Jan H. W. Stoeckenius

Abstract

We analyze equilibria in exchange economies following the approach taken by Borch and Wilson. We correct Wilson's main result by showing that linear contracts are sufficient but not necessary for the existence of syndicates under heterogeneous beliefs. We introduce the concept of the decomposability of syndicates and demonstrate that linear contracts are necessary only for arbitrarily decomposable syndicates. This implies that groups that form syndicates under an arbitrary set of beliefs must also employ linear contracts.

DOI
10.2307/1912281
Volume
51
Issue
5
Pages
1407
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex

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