Econometrica Vol. 71 No. 4 2003
Games Played Through Agents
open access
Abstract
We introduce a game of complete information with multiple principals and multiple common agents. Each agent makes a decision that can affect the payoffs of all principals. Each principal offers monetary transfers to each agent conditional on the action taken by the agent. We characterize pure-strategy equilibria and we provide conditions—in terms of game balancedness—for the existence of an equilibrium with an efficient outcome. Games played through agents display a type of strategic inefficiency that is absent when either there is a unique principal or there is a unique agent.
- DOI
- 10.1111/1468-0262.00437
- Volume
- 71
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 989-1026
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref