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Econometrica Vol. 71 No. 4 2003

Games Played Through Agents

Andrea Prat1,2; Aldo Rustichini1,2

1 University of Minnesota · 2 London School of Economics and Political Science

open access

Abstract

We introduce a game of complete information with multiple principals and multiple common agents. Each agent makes a decision that can affect the payoffs of all principals. Each principal offers monetary transfers to each agent conditional on the action taken by the agent. We characterize pure-strategy equilibria and we provide conditions—in terms of game balancedness—for the existence of an equilibrium with an efficient outcome. Games played through agents display a type of strategic inefficiency that is absent when either there is a unique principal or there is a unique agent.

DOI
10.1111/1468-0262.00437
Volume
71
Issue
4
Pages
989-1026
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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