Econometrica Vol. 58 No. 6 1990
Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
Abstract
The authors study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition, macroeconomic coordination failures, arms races, bank runs, technology adoption and diffusion, R&D competition, pretrial bargaining, coordination in teams, and many others. For all these games, the sets of pure strategy Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds. Also, for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best-response dynamics and Bayesian learning, the players' choices lie eventually within the same bounds. These bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters.
- DOI
- 10.2307/2938316
- Volume
- 58
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1255
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex