← Search

Econometrica Vol. 73 No. 1 2005

Money in Search Equilibrium, in Competitive Equilibrium, and in Competitive Search Equilibrium

Guillaume Rocheteau1,2; Randall Wright1,3,4,2

1 University of the Sciences · 2 Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland · 3 Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas · 4 Thales (Australia)

Abstract

We compare three market structures for monetary economies: bargaining (search equilibrium); price taking (competitive equilibrium); and price posting (competitive search equilibrium). We also extend work on the microfoundations of money by allowing a general matching technology and entry. We study how equilibrium and the effects of policy depend on market structure. Under bargaining, trade and entry are both inefficient, and inflation implies first-order welfare losses. Under price taking, the Friedman rule solves the first inefficiency but not the second, and inflation may actually improve welfare. Under posting, the Friedman rule yields the first best, and inflation implies second-order welfare losses.

DOI
10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00568.x
Volume
73
Issue
1
Pages
175-202
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite