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Econometrica Vol. 60 No. 4 1992

A More Robust Definition of Subjective Probability

Mark J. Machina; David Schmeidler

Abstract

Although their goal is to separate a decision maker's underlying beliefs (their subjective probabilities of events) from their preferences (their attitudes toward risk), classic choice-theoretic derivations of subjective probability all rely upon some form of the Marschak-Samuelson "Independence Axiom" or the Savage "Sure-Thing Principle, " which is equivalent to requiring that the decision maker's preferences over lotteries conform to the expected utility hypothesis. This paper presents a choice-theoretic derivation of subjective probability which satisfies the axioms of classical probability theory, but which neither assumes nor implies that the decision maker's preferences over lotteries necessarily conform to the expected utility hypothesis.

DOI
10.2307/2951565
Volume
60
Issue
4
Pages
745
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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