Econometrica Vol. 87 No. 5 2019

Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange

Ivan Balbuzanov¹; Maciej H. Kotowski²

¹ Department of Economics, University of Melbourne () · ² John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Abstract

We propose a new solution for discrete exchange economies and resource‐allocation problems, the exclusion core. The exclusion core rests upon a foundational idea in the legal understanding of property, the right to exclude others. By reinterpreting endowments as a distribution of exclusion rights, rather than as bundles of goods, our analysis extends to economies with qualified property rights, joint ownership, and social hierarchies. The exclusion core is characterized by a generalized top trading cycle algorithm in a large class of economies, including those featuring private, public, and mixed ownership. It is neither weaker nor stronger than the strong core.

DOI

10.3982/ecta15676

Volume

87

Issue

5

Pages

1663-1692

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite

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