Econometrica Vol. 87 No. 4 2019

Preferences for Truth‐Telling

Johannes Abeler^1,2,3; Daniele Nosenzo^4,5; Collin Raymond⁶

¹ Department of Economics, University of Oxford · ² IZA · ³ CESifo · ⁴ School of Economics, University of Nottingham · ⁵ Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER) · ⁶ Krannert School of Management Purdue University

Abstract

Private information is at the heart of many economic activities. For decades, economists have assumed that individuals are willing to misreport private information if this maximizes their material payoff. We combine data from 90 experimental studies in economics, psychology, and sociology, and show that, in fact, people lie surprisingly little. We then formalize a wide range of potential explanations for the observed behavior, identify testable predictions that can distinguish between the models, and conduct new experiments to do so. Our empirical evidence suggests that a preference for being seen as honest and a preference for being honest are the main motivations for truth‐telling.

DOI

10.3982/ecta14673

Volume

87

Issue

4

Pages

1115-1153

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

Cite

APA 7 MLA 9 Chicago (author–date) Harvard Elsevier Harvard (JFE, JBF…) The Accounting Review Academy of Management American Marketing Association INFORMS (Management Science) Copy citation Copied ✓