Econometrica Vol. 81 No. 6 2013

Every Choice Function Is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable

Walter Bossert¹; Yves Sprumont^1,2

¹ Université de Montréal · ² Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council

Abstract

A choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable if there exists a finite perfect-information extensive-form game such that for each subset of alternatives, the backwards-induction outcome of the restriction of the game to that subset of alternatives coincides with the choice from that subset. We prove that every choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable.

DOI

10.3982/ecta11419

Volume

81

Issue

6

Pages

2521-2534

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex

Cite

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