Econometrica Vol. 61 No. 6 1993
t or 1 - t. That is the Trade-Off
Abstract
A social welfare function f is Arrowian if it has transitive values and satisfies Arrow's independence axiom. For any fraction t and any Arrowian f, either there will be some individual who dictates on a subset containing at least the fraction t of outcomes, or at least the fraction 1 minus t of the pairs of outcomes have their social ranking fixed independently of individual preference. And for any Arrowian f, there is a set containing a large fraction of the citizens whose preferences are never consulted in determining the social ranking of a large fraction of the pairs of alternatives.
- DOI
- 10.2307/2951646
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1355
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex