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Econometrica Vol. 88 No. 3 2020

The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games With Anonymous Random Matching

Joyee Deb1; Takuo Sugaya2; Alexander Wolitzky3

1 Yale School of Management, Yale University · 2 Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University · 3 Department of Economics, MIT

Abstract

We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games with anonymous random matching. We allow non‐uniform matching, include asymmetric payoffs, and place no restrictions on the stage game other than full dimensionality. No record‐keeping or communication devices—including cheap talk communication and public randomization—are necessary.

DOI
10.3982/ecta16680
Volume
88
Issue
3
Pages
917-964
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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