Econometrica Vol. 63 No. 6 1995
Reputation and Commitment in Two-Person Repeated Games Without Discounting
Abstract
Two-person repeated games with no discounting are considered where there is uncertainty about the type of the players. If there is a possibility that a player is an automaton committed to a particular pure or mixed stage -game action, then this provides a lower bound on the Nash equilibrium payoffs to a normal type of this player. The lower bound is the best available and is robust to the existence of other types. The results are extended to the case of two-sided uncertainty. This work extends Schmidt (1993) who analysed the restricted class of conflicting interest games.
- DOI
- 10.2307/2171775
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1401
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex