Econometrica Vol. 93 No. 3 2025
Auctioning Control and Cash‐Flow Rights Separately
Abstract
We consider a classical auction setting in which an asset/project is sold to buyers who privately receive signals about expected payoffs, and payoffs are more sensitive to a bidder's signal if he runs the project than if another bidder does. We show that a seller can increase revenues by sometimes allocating cash‐flow rights and control to different bidders, for example, with the highest bidder receiving cash flows and the second‐highest receiving control. Separation reduces a bidder's information rent, which depends on the importance of his private information for the value of his awarded cash flows. As project payoffs are most sensitive to a bidder's information if he controls the project, allocating cash flow to another bidder lowers bidders' informational advantage. As a result, when signals are close, the seller can increase revenues by splitting rights between the top two bidders.
- DOI
- 10.3982/ecta21343
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 859-889
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex