Econometrica Vol. 74 No. 6 2006

Optimal Use of Communication Resources

Olivier Gossner^1,2,3,4; Penélope Hernández^1,2,3,4; Abraham Neyman^1,2,3,4

¹ Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique · ² University of Alicante · ³ Hebrew University of Jerusalem · ⁴ École des hautes études en sciences sociales

Abstract

We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better-informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs.

DOI

10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00720.x

Volume

74

Issue

6

Pages

1603-1636

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite

APA 7 MLA 9 Chicago (author–date) Harvard Elsevier Harvard (JFE, JBF…) The Accounting Review Academy of Management American Marketing Association INFORMS (Management Science) Copy citation Copied ✓