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Econometrica Vol. 90 No. 1 2022

Robust Screens for Noncompetitive Bidding in Procurement Auctions

Sylvain Chassang1; Kei Kawai2; Jun Nakabayashi3; Juan Ortner4

1 Department of Economics Princeton University · 2 Department of Economics, U.C. Berkeley · 3 Department of Economics, Kindai University · 4 Department of Economics, Boston University

Abstract

We document a novel bidding pattern observed in procurement auctions from Japan: winning bids tend to be isolated, and there is a missing mass of close losing bids. This pattern is suspicious in the following sense: its extreme forms are inconsistent with competitive behavior under arbitrary information structures. Building on this observation, we develop systematic tests of competitive behavior in procurement auctions that allow for general information structures as well as nonstationary unobserved heterogeneity. We provide an empirical exploration of our tests, and show they can help identify other suspicious patterns in the data.

DOI
10.3982/ecta17155
Volume
90
Issue
1
Pages
315-346
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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