Econometrica Vol. 90 No. 1 2022
Media Competition and Social Disagreement
Abstract
We study the competitive provision and endogenous acquisition of political information. Our main result identifies a natural equilibrium channel through which a more competitive market decreases the efficiency of policy outcomes. A critical insight we put forward is that competition among information providers leads to informational specialization: firms provide relatively less information on issues that are of common interest and relatively more information on issues on which agents' preferences are heterogeneous. This enables agents to acquire information about different aspects of the policy, specifically, those that are particularly important to them. This leads to an increase in social disagreement, which has negative welfare implications. We establish that, in large enough societies, competition makes every agent worse off by decreasing the utility that she derives from the policy outcome. Furthermore, we show that this decline cannot be compensated by the decrease in prices resulting from competition.
- DOI
- 10.3982/ecta16417
- Volume
- 90
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 223-265
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex