Econometrica Vol. 70 No. 3 2002
Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
Abstract
We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists that provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex-ante and implements the efficient allocation conditional on the private information ex-post. It is shown that in every private value environment the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism guarantees both ex-ante as well as ex-post efficiency. In contrast, with common values, ex-ante and ex-post efficiency cannot be reconciled in general. Sufficient conditions in terms of sub- and supermodularity are provided when (all) ex-post efficient mechanisms lead to private under- or over-acquisition of information.
- DOI
- 10.1111/1468-0262.00317
- Volume
- 70
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1007-1033
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref