Econometrica Vol. 93 No. 2 2025
Feedback Design in Dynamic Moral Hazard
Abstract
We study the joint design of dynamic incentives and performance feedback for an environment with a coarse (all‐or‐nothing) measure of performance, and show that hiding information from the agent can be an optimal way to motivate effort. Using a novel approach to incentive compatibility, we derive a two‐phase solution that begins with a “silent phase” where the agent is given no feedback and is asked to work non‐stop, and ends with a “full‐transparency phase” where the agent stops working as soon as a performance threshold is met. Hiding information leads to greater effort, but an ignorant agent is also more expensive to motivate. The two‐phase solution—where the agent's ignorance is fully frontloaded—stems from a “backward compounding effect” that raises the cost of hiding information as time passes.
- DOI
- 10.3982/ecta21871
- Volume
- 93
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 597-621
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref