Econometrica Vol. 69 No. 4 2001

Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures

Bhaskar Dutta¹; Matthew O. Jackson²; Michel Le Breton

¹ Indian Statistical Institute · ² California Institute of Technology

Abstract

We study the incentives of candidates to strategically affect the outcome of a voting procedure. We show that the outcomes of every nondictatorial voting procedure that satisfies unanimity will be affected by the incentives of noncontending candidates (i.e., who cannot win the election) to influence the outcome by entering or exiting the election.

DOI

10.1111/1468-0262.00228

Volume

69

Issue

4

Pages

1013-1037

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex

Cite

APA 7 MLA 9 Chicago (author–date) Harvard Elsevier Harvard (JFE, JBF…) The Accounting Review Academy of Management American Marketing Association INFORMS (Management Science) Copy citation Copied ✓