Econometrica Vol. 58 No. 5 1990
Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
Abstract
This paper investigates pure strategy sequential equilibria of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. The approach emphasizes the equilibrium value set and the static optimization problems embedded in extremal equilibria. A succession of propositions, central among which is "self-generation, " allow properties of constrained efficient supergame equilibria to be deduced from the solutions of the static problems. The authors show that the latter include solutions having a "bang-bang" property; this affords a significant simplification of the equilibria that need be considered. These results apply to a broad class of asymmetric games, thereby generalizing their earlier work on optimal cartel equilibria.
- DOI
- 10.2307/2938299
- Volume
- 58
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1041
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex