Econometrica Vol. 73 No. 2 2005
Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
Abstract
We introduce a class of strategies that generalizes examples constructed in two-player games under imperfect private monitoring. A sequential equilibrium is belief-free if, after every private history, each player's continuation strategy is optimal independently of his belief about his opponents' private histories. We provide a simple and sharp characterization of equilibrium payoffs using those strategies. While such strategies support a large set of payoffs, they are not rich enough to generate a folk theorem in most games besides the prisoner's dilemma, even when noise vanishes.
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00583.x
- Volume
- 73
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 377-415
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref