Econometrica Vol. 88 No. 6 2020

Sequential Information Design

Laura Doval¹; Jeffrey C. Ely²

¹ Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology · ² Department of Economics, Northwestern University

Abstract

We study games of incomplete information as both the information structure and the extensive form vary. An analyst may know the payoff‐relevant data but not the players' private information, nor the extensive form that governs their play. Alternatively, a designer may be able to build a mechanism from these ingredients. We characterize all outcomes that can arise in an equilibrium of some extensive form with some information structure. We show how to specialize our main concept to capture the additional restrictions implied by extensive‐form refinements.

DOI

10.3982/ecta17260

Volume

88

Issue

6

Pages

2575-2608

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite

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