Econometrica Vol. 81 No. 1 2013

On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation

Alex Gershkov¹; Jacob K. Goeree^2,3; Alexey Kushnir^2,3; Benny Moldovanu⁴; Xianwen Shi^5,6

¹ Hebrew University of Jerusalem · ² ZHAW Zurich University of Applied Sciences · ³ University of Zurich · ⁴ University of Bonn · ⁵ University of the West · ⁶ University of Toronto

Abstract

We consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent, one-dimensional, private types. We prove that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that delivers the same interim expected utilities for all agents and the same ex ante expected social surplus. The short proof is based on an extension of an elegant result due to Gutmann, Kemperman, Reeds, and Shepp (1991). We also show that the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation generally breaks down when the main assumptions underlying the social choice model are relaxed or when the equivalence concept is strengthened to apply to interim expected allocations.

DOI

10.3982/ecta10592

Volume

81

Issue

1

Pages

197-220

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite

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