Econometrica Vol. 80 No. 2 2012

The Distributive Impact of Reforms in Credit Enforcement: Evidence From Indian Debt Recovery Tribunals

Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal¹; Dilip Mookherjee^2,3; Sujata Visaria^4,5,6,7

¹ Stockholm School of Economics · ² Boston University · ³ Bay State College · ⁴ Hong Kong University of Science and Technology · ⁵ Sudan Meteorological Authority · ⁶ University College London · ⁷ University of Hong Kong

Abstract

It is generally presumed that stronger legal enforcement of lender rights increases credit access for all borrowers because it expands the set of incentive compatible loan contracts. This result relies on an assumption that the supply of credit is infinitely elastic. In contrast, with inelastic supply, stronger enforcement generates general equilibrium effects that may reduce credit access for small borrowers and expand it for wealthy borrowers. In a firm-level panel, we find evidence that an Indian judicial reform that increased banks' ability to recover nonperforming loans had such an adverse distributive impact.

DOI

10.3982/ecta9038

Volume

80

Issue

2

Pages

497-558

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite

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