Econometrica Vol. 79 No. 5 2011

Simple Bounds on the Value of a Reputation

Olivier Gossner^1,2

¹ Sächsisches Landesamt für Umwelt, Landwirtschaft und Geologie · ² Paris School of Economics

Abstract

We introduce entropy techniques to study the classical reputation model in which a long-run player faces a series of short-run players. The long-run player's actions are possibly imperfectly observed. We derive explicit lower and upper bounds on the equilibrium payoffs to the long-run player.

DOI

10.3982/ecta9385

Volume

79

Issue

5

Pages

1627-1641

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex

Cite

APA 7 MLA 9 Chicago (author–date) Harvard Elsevier Harvard (JFE, JBF…) The Accounting Review Academy of Management American Marketing Association INFORMS (Management Science) Copy citation Copied ✓