Econometrica Vol. 56 No. 6 1988
Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
Abstract
The authors consider auctions for a single indivisible object when bidders have information about each other that is unavailable to the seller. They show that the seller can use this information to his own benefit, and they characterize th e environments in which a well-chosen auction gives him the same expected payoff as that obtainable were he able to see the object und er full information. This hinges on the possibility of constructing lotteries with the correct properties. The authors study the problem for auctions where the bidders have dominant strategies and those where the relevant equilibrium concept is Bayesian-Nash.
- DOI
- 10.2307/1913096
- Volume
- 56
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1247
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex