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Econometrica Vol. 81 No. 2 2013

Identification and Inference in Ascending Auctions With Correlated Private Values

Andrés Aradillas-López; Amit Gandhi; Daniel Quint

University of Wisconsin–Madison

Abstract

We introduce and apply a new nonparametric approach to identification and inference on data from ascending auctions. We exploit variation in the number of bidders across auctions to nonparametrically identify useful bounds on seller profit and bidder surplus using a general model of correlated private values that nests the standard IPV model. We also translate our identified bounds into closed form and asymptotically valid confidence intervals for several economic measures of interest. Applying our methods to much-studied U.S. Forest Service timber auctions, we find evidence of correlation among values after controlling for a rich vector of relevant auction covariates; this correlation causes expected profit, the profit-maximizing reserve price, and bidder surplus to be substantially lower than conventional (IPV) analysis of the data would suggest. ∗ We are very thankful to the editor Jean-Marc Robin and three anonymous referees for their insightful feedback;

DOI
10.3982/ecta9431
Volume
81
Issue
2
Pages
489-534
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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