Econometrica Vol. 57 No. 5 1989
Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
Abstract
A new framework for games in continuous time is proposed. The continuous-time model conforms as closely as possible to the conventional discrete-time framework. Indeed, continuous time is viewed as "discrete time, but with a grid that is infinitely fine." The paper presents several examples illustrating the difficulties that arise in continuous-time game theory. Theorems relate the equilibria of continuous time games to the equilibria of approximating discrete time games. A variety of industrial organization applications are studied, yielding sharp predictions. Applications include continuously repeated games, preemption models, and patent races.
- DOI
- 10.2307/1913627
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1171
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref