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Econometrica Vol. 78 No. 4 2010

Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner's Curse?: An Experimental Study

Asen Ivanov1; Dan Levin2; Muriel Niederle3,4

1 Virginia Commonwealth University · 2 The Ohio State University · 3 Girls Incorporated · 4 Stanford University

open access

Abstract

We use a second-price common-value auction, called the maximal game, to experimentally study whether the winner's curse (WC) can be explained by models which retain best-response behavior but allow for inconsistent beliefs. We compare behavior in a regular version of the maximal game, where the WC can be explained by inconsistent beliefs, to behavior in versions where such explanations are less plausible. We find little evidence of differences in behavior. Overall, our study casts a serious doubt on theories that posit the WC is driven by beliefs.

DOI
10.3982/ecta8112
Volume
78
Issue
4
Pages
1435-1452
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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