Econometrica Vol. 80 No. 2 2012

Vote-Buying and Reciprocity

Frederico Finan¹; Laura Schechter^2,3

¹ University of California, Berkeley · ² University of Wisconsin–Madison · ³ Faculdades Guarulhos

Abstract

While vote-buying is common, little is known about how politicians determine who to target. We argue that vote-buying can be sustained by an internalized norm of reciprocity. Receiving money engenders feelings of obligation. Combining survey data on vote-buying with an experiment-based measure of reciprocity, we show that politicians target reciprocal individuals. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of social preferences in determining political behavior.

DOI

10.3982/ecta9035

Volume

80

Issue

2

Pages

863-881

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite

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