Econometrica Vol. 93 No. 1 2025

The Political Economy of Zero‐Sum Thinking

S. Nageeb Ali¹; Maximilian Mihm²; Lucas Siga³

¹ Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University · ² Division of Social Science, New York University Abu Dhabi · ³ Department of Economics, University of Essex

Abstract

This paper offers a strategic rationale for zero‐sum thinking in elections. We show that asymmetric information and distributional considerations together make voters wary of policies supported by others. This force impels a majority of voters to support policies contrary to their preferences and information. Our analysis identifies and interprets a form of “adverse correlation” that is necessary and sufficient for zero‐sum thinking to prevail in equilibrium.

DOI

10.3982/ecta22474

Volume

93

Issue

1

Pages

41-70

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite

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