Econometrica Vol. 53 No. 3 1985
Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect Information
Abstract
[The existence of perfect equilibrium is demonstrated for a class of games with compact space of histories and continuous payoffs, and in which the set of actions feasible at any given period is a lower hemicontinuous correspondence of the previous history of the game. The proof is by construction. A set of histories is constructed, each of which is the equilibrium path of some perfect equilibrium point of the game. Also, any equilibrium path is a member of this set. The construction therefore provides a characterization of perfect equilibrium.]
- DOI
- 10.2307/1911658
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 613
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref