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Journal of Accounting Research Vol. 49 No. 1 2011

Disagreement and the Cost of Capital

Robert J. Bloomfield1; Paul E. Fischer2,1,3

1 Cornell University · 2 University of British Columbia · 3 University of Rochester

Abstract

We assess how forms of disagreement among investors affect a firm's cost of capital. Firms experience a lower cost of capital if investors perceive that other investors are ignoring relevant disclosures (perceived errors of omission), but a higher cost of capital if investors perceive that others are responding to irrelevant disclosures (perceived errors of commission). The impact of these two sources of disagreement on the cost of capital is determined by the distribution of opinion and the nature of disclosure. For example, even though aggregated disclosures reveal less to investors, aggregated disclosures may decrease the cost of capital by eliminating disagreement associated with perceived errors of commission. These and additional results arise because the cost of capital is driven not only by investors’ uncertainty about the firm's future earnings performance, but also by investors’ uncertainty about the evolution of beliefs, which partly determines the path of prices.

DOI
10.1111/j.1475-679x.2010.00389.x
Volume
49
Issue
1
Pages
41-68
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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