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Journal of Accounting Research Vol. 42 No. 1 2004

Efficient Manipulation in a Repeated Setting

Joel S. Demski1; Hans Frimor2; David E. M. Sappington1

1 University of Florida · 2 University of Southern Denmark

Abstract

We analyze the optimal behavior of an organization when its employees can manipulate the organization's accounting system to their private advantage. We find that the organization may benefit by helping its employees manipulate the system. This help can reduce the employees' private returns from devoting effort to further manipulation of the accounting system, which reduces the cost of motivating the employees to devote their effort to improving the real (rather than the measured) performance of the organization.

DOI
10.1111/j.1475-679x.2004.00128.x
Volume
42
Issue
1
Pages
31-49
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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